This text sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, and asks if there is such a clear version of free will. It goes on to ask whether or not determinism is true and what can we conclude about our lives if it is. Both the compatabilist and incompatabilist traditions are explored.



This is a fully revised, enlarged and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic 'How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem'. In the first four chapters, he sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question 'Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?' He also considers whether there is such an adequate version of the free will doctrine. He goes on to the question of whether determinism is refuted by Quantum Theory or anything else ... and then the question of what we are to conclude about our lives if it is true. The tradition of Incompatibilist philosophers says that if it is true we cannot be free and responsible. Compatibilist philosophers say we still can be. Ted Honderich rejects both traditions, and proposes an affirmative attitude to determinism ... before coming to new thoughts about the very nature of the problem. He offers a concise and lively introduction to the problem of determinism and freedom, as well as advancing the debate further in this fundamental part of the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. Essential reading for philosophers and all others faced by the great problem.